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Introduction
The critical questions and anxieties surrounding the encroachment of data driven
algorithmic technology is not unprecedented. Most technological advancements throughout
history have been met with some sort of resistance that eventually wanes with general acceptance
of the technologies' expediency. Convenience and practicality do not need to be sacrificed to
develop a more critical and comprehensive approach to digital surveillance, but rather
supplemented with an equitable, conscientious long term model. I analyze the far reaching
political implications of these new modes of technocratic management through the abolitionist
lens. Crime has long been analyzed as a way to further understand underlying social problems in
civil society and policing and prisons are the most prominent and well funded solution for
managing these instances of unrest. Abolitionist organizing seeks to redirect resources from the
penal system to invest in education, health services, and employment to address the roots of
crime ultimately divesting from carceral or punitive mechanisms of justice and correctional
institutions. The Abolitionist framework is the concentration on policing as an institution through
which many forms of oppression intersect and are legitimized through structural and violent
reinforcement. The essential element to this praxis is tenacious imagination or radical
exploration coupled with conscientious scrutiny over the distribution of material resources to
center and empower the most vulnerable populations under a socioeconomic hierarchy. It follows
the conflict theory model of Marxists with the premise that police exist as a tool for the
bourgeoisie to violently enforce class stratification and protect their property. Abolitionists add to
this model with a crucial emphasis on intersectionality: how race, class, gender, disability and
other marginal identities interact with the system to exacerbate the impact of capitalist
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domination. Through an intersectional approach to the abolition of policing, other forms of
systemic oppression can be understood and dismantled. To the extent abolitionism helps
understand mechanisms of repression that develop from policing, it is also a useful lens for
understanding the broader societal consequences that stem from implementation of digital
surveillance or algorithms into this nexus of crime and punishment. The fear surrounding this
technology is rational and legitimate, however crises concerning personal privacy and inequality
are not inherent to the development of algorithms, but rather the society that produces them. The
technology itself is neutral; alone, it does not have the agency to oppress or liberate a population,
yet it is still central to questions about power and exploitation. For example, an algorithm
designed to recognize names of people, process, then categorize them is neutral. How it
categorizes the names and the meaning attached to those categorizations, however, cannot be
neutral as it is informed by human subjectivity. Unfortunately, data driven algorithmic
technology is implemented with the misleading assumption that it removes human subjectivity
for a more mathematical, statistical, and colorblind approach to civil management. Helga
Nowotny refers to the work of scholars of science and technology studies (STS) who find that:
Technologies are always selectively taken up. They are gendered. They are appropriated
and translated into products around which new markets emerge that give another boost to
global capitalism. The benefits of technological innovation are never equally distributed,
and already existing social inequalities are deepened through accelerated technological
change. But it is never technology alone that acts as an external force bringing about
social change. Rather, technologies and technological change are products and the
outcome of societal, cultural and economic conditions and result from many
co-productive processes (2021).
If technology exists in a state of inertia, what systems or actors move the wheels of oppression?
How does technology become a mechanism in deepening inequality? This comparative study
will examine the political implications of the proliferation of digital surveillance and data driven
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algorithms in modern life in the United States and China. These two nations are key to
understanding how this technology is being developed and implemented because not only are
they considered innovative leaders in the sector, surveillance technology has become a normative
tool in both states. In this sense, digital technologies and engagement with algorithms are already
widespread, adapted by state powers, corporations, and civilians, and irrevocably entrenched in
civil society. I find that the domination of hierarchical structures is consequential in the
execution of digital technology, thus it is important to examine how they affect the already
uneven power dynamics between police and civilian populations which are heavily policed.
The United States has had globally unprecedented rates of incarceration since the 1970s
and China, more recently, has come under international scrutiny for their heavily militarized
police state which scholars claim targets a vulnerable population of Uighur muslims. Despite the
different political and ideological regimes, it is within the authority of punishment and policing
to deliver the most extreme criminal sanctions through which the embrace of technocratic
surveillance algorithms produces dangerous, yet eerily similar oppressive paradigms. The
implementation of data driven algorithms into these systems known for human rights abuses,
requires urgent comprehension and action. Most scholars call on Western leaders in the US and
Europe to implement regulations and privacy safeguards to not only promote a more liberal
democratic model for surveillance to counter the leading technology in China, but also curtail the
incursion on many aspects of our social or private lives. In this breadth, I find the opportunities
for resistance are indeed greater in the US than in the authoritative state of China. However,
modern Neo-liberal concepts of universalism in human rights, identity, and liberty are
historically rooted in “a Western-centric worldview, and its spread around the world
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paradoxically led to the exploitation and exclusion of subaltern populations, be they women,
LGBT people or the colonized’ (Nowotny 2021). Therefore, David Brin’s theories encouraging a
broader public acceptance of the irreversible entrenchment of digital algorithmic technologies
into this system are absolutely crucial to develop resistance mechanisms more effective than
agitating for bureaucratic red tape.
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Chapter 1 Theoretical Foundation for Digital Technologies and AI
Before we reckon with the transformative effects of digital technology in modern society,
it is essential to examine how boundaries of society have historically been reconciled with the
innovations of technology. Acknowledging the inextricable link between paradigms of
technology and the supposed progress of civil society, allows for meaningful and realistic
methods of resistance or integration for those being surveilled. If technological systems
functionally reproduce racial hierarchical structures under capitalism, then the societal or
historical contexts which produce inequalities in the system must be understood. According to
Brin, the hierarchical political relationships of feudalism have been transformed by the
development of a significant middle class in modern global capitalism. Surveillance “is a French
word, meaning to look down at people from above;” despite emancipatory movements and the
establishment of liberal democracy, elites have and will always see (2016). Policing and prisons
are an invention which exist beyond criminal deterrence as an apparatus for enhancing state and
capital power through a monopoly on force. The fact that punitive control continues to expand,
implementing digital surveillance into its mechanisms, while crime rates have consistently
decreased over the past several decades is reflective of this mode of production rather than the
technical requirements of crime control. Penal policy is the most violent element “within a wider
strategy of controlling the poor, in which factories, workhouses, the poor law, and of course, the
labor-market, all play corresponding parts” (Garland 2014). In this socio- economic
superstructure, the fact that elite institutions both bureaucratic and private have “selectively”
taken up data-driven technologies to enhance this power is not extraordinary. Neither is the
attempt to divest from explicit repression to invest in the supposedly neutral, quantification and
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qualification of data, standardization for social measurements, and professionalization of
diagnostic and corrective power. How can we contend with surveillance and data driven
algorithms exacerbating oppressive or penal aspects of social life if we fail to acknowledge how
the most menacing, oppressive, extreme threats of digital algorithms to the disadvantaged are
already inherent to policing?
This perspective forces an engagement with power dynamics as a productive force of
technological and social dynamics which draws on Michel Foucault’s theories of power and
mechanisms of control derived from punitive institutions. Foucault describes the rise of prisons
as a demonstration of further abstraction in the power of the law and the power that law exerts, a
similar discursive argument to the power of predictive algorithms that Nowtny asserts. The
transformations from monarchical power under feudalism to state power under capitalism
mentioned above coincided with the invention of prisons and state authority over punishment.
For example, punitive institutions and measures such as “galley slavery, transportation, forced
labour, the early modern houses of correction, and even twentieth-century rehabilitative regimes,
have been positively shaped by the concern to use convict labour, and are presented clear as clear
instances where economic interest was the leading determinant of penological innovations”
(Garland 2014). Under modern state bureaucracy, people become juridical and knowable
subjects with certain rights wherein capital punishment and torture become absorbed into less
visible functions of the state. This model proves useful for understanding the sometimes
discretionary versus centralized use of complex systems as a mechanism for social management.
The material conditions of the most impoverished in society interacting and responding in
symbiosis with penal institutions fulfills the managerial objective of “less eligibility:” the
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conditions of punishment must be more severe than the conditions of the working class (Garland
2014). In many aspects the civil, social and institutional experiences of the poor are similar to
that of prisoners because of this strategic overlap and interrelated functionality. This has
substantial economic significance because prisons are often framed as a legitimate ideological
and structural solution to “idleness” or unemployment which is associated with criminality.
Garland synthesizes Rusche and Kirchheimer theory that “far from being an inevitable aspect of
social progress, penal reform occurs only where economic exigencies are relaxed, or when
‘humanitarian principles coincide… with the economic necessities of the time;” even then these
reforms can and will be the first surrendered to the mercy of market crises. (2014). While an elite
class of profiteers play key roles as executors and administrators in technocratic implementation,
they are dependent on a small population of AI engineers to conceive and transform data sets to
algorithmic praxis usually informed by these socially weighted codes. Further down the chain of
production and distribution comes the exploitation of millions of blue collar laborers like
warehouse workers or delivery drivers. Employment or the threat of starvation under
unemployment is a form of social control that maintains Capitalist exploitation. From Foucault’s
theory of punishment as a mechanism through which the state marks, categorizes, and constructs
subjects, one can understand discipline as something that is delivered from the top to the bottom
or a function and tool for those with power. Foucault argues that “the workshop, the school, the
army were subject to a whole micro-penalty of time,” in the sense that they implemented
hierarchical methods and standards of control which incorporated standardized schedules and
subtle punishments for a range of behaviors, despite being social and communal institutions
(187). These modes of management have larger implications both for behavioral performance
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and state orientation as both the institutional benefits of “order” and individual incentives and
rewards for adherence to codes contribute to the maintenance of these paradigms. The
domination of big tech in capitalist markets is driven by gig-economy labor; a new digital sector
with visceral anti-union proclivities historically reinforced by police and new surveillance
capabilities driven by their market needs. Mark Coekelbergh points out that not only are personal
electronic devices produced under slave-like conditions but under data-driven capitalism “as
users of social media and other apps that require our data…we are doing free labor for social
media companies and their clients (advertisers): we produce a commodity (data), which is sold to
corporations” (2022). From its inception, digital algorithmic technology cannot be dissociated
from capitalist modes of production and oppressive labor conditions. AI systems learn and adapt
in a coercive, hierarchical labor market as well as within an extremely punitive penal system
which utilizes carceral and punitive ideology to address social problems. Digital algorithms learn
that any form of social deviance must be met with punishment rather than care which effectively
reinforces class, race, and gender stratification.
Ruha Benjamin’s book on Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim
Code posits historical roots which connect digital technology and AI development to racial
domination and exploitation. The word “robot” derives from the Czech word “robota” meaning
compulsory or forced labor, so she scrutinizes the relationship between the dehumanizing
rhetoric used for robots and language about master and slave dynamics. Coeckelbergh’s chapter
“Freedom: Manipulation by AI and Robot Slavery” takes this discursive approach connecting it
to the Marxist model. He links the development of AI to capitalist systems of labor, production,
and hierarchies. Technology integrated into capitalism which exploits, alienates, and criminalizes
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working class laborers will be a mechanism of further disaffection. Given the unequal
distribution of powers and profit from modern the digital data ecosystem, this constructs a
unique niche for exploitation and oppression. The state transformed many logics in social theory
and modes of punishment to become increasingly bureaucratic, professionalized, and scientific.
Technical approaches to management or “the belief that science is the best and only means by
which society should determine its norms and values - has colluded with the interests of
politically or socially powerful groups” (Nowotny 2021). Ruha Benjamin references Khalil
Muhammad’s study of the early 20th century “racial data revolution” wherein the violent
enforcement necessary to maintain systemic oppression was replaced by “new tools of analysis,
namely racial statistics and social surveys” to develop theories on society and race (2019).
Human racial, gender, and class subjectivity invaded these new processing and categorization
“methods and data sources” to construct “black criminality…alongside disease and intelligence,
as a fundamental measure of black inferiority” (Benjamin 2019). She emphasizes this social
theory assigned certain meaning to particular codes with oppressive consequences because the
label of criminal “in this era, is code for Black, but also for poor, immigrant, second-class,
disposable, unwanted, detritus” (2019). As social theory was legitimized through technical
approaches to categorization, mathematically driven AI models we live with now were just
beginning to be developed at the math department at Dartmouth college in 1956 (Coded Bias
2020). This small faction of white men decided to measure intelligence by the ability to play and
beat opponents in games, particularly chess. These concepts of imagery, intelligence, technology,
and what matters in society we consider standard and normal values of measurement “are
actually ideas that come from a very small, homogenous group of people” (Meredith Broussard
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Coded Bias). Data driven-algorithms are designed to cheaply evaluate a large number of people
with a bulk of information; they are specialized to find solutions within a very specific set of
rules limiting the sorts of variability, flexibility, and deliberation necessary to discern
comprehensive solutions to human social problems. The relatively small population of wealthy
people receive the benefit of personal input, recommendations, and face-to face interviews, so
under the mode of production described above, AI will be integrated into the larger institutional
network of performativity tasked with managing the poor (O’ Neil 2016). The concept of
“garbage in, garbage out” specifically criticizes how inputting low-quality or nonsensical data, of
typically underrepresented or misrepresented groups into a system “will produce low-quality or
nonsensical results'' regardless of the sophistication and power of the system (Garvie 3). The
structures of global racial capitalism rest on anti-blackness; increased accuracy or the inclusion
of black faces in digital surveillance systems under capitalism “is no straightforward good, but a
form of unwanted exposure” because symbolic meanings in society of acceptable and deviant
people are highly distorted by state and elite motivation to legitimize authority over punishment.
Although the United States’ social and theoretical context of data collection and classification is
not exactly the same as that in China, the technocratic state still demonstrates the power of
cultural coding according to “the invisible ‘center’ against which everything else is compared
and as the ‘norm’ against which everyone else is measured” (Benjamin 2019). The digital
technocratic epoch we know now is marked by the integration of fairly homogenous socially
dominant classes of male computer scientists and mathematicians into an already stratified elite
class. Cathy O’Neil states “like gods, these mathematical models were opaque, their workings
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invisible to all but the highest priests in their domain: mathematicians and computer scientists”
(2016).
The advances and developments in the modern digital sector grow at a significantly
greater rate than exponential growth so the legitimization of perceived impartiality in algorithms
built on subjective data sets presents unprecedented and expansive potential for exacerbating
already existing inequalities. Within the Western academic and professional sphere this creates
problems for transparency because comprehension, and discernment regarding algorithms is
further alienated from the poor and particularly black and latino communities. In China, some of
their surveillance technologies are targeted specifically at the minority population of Uyghyr
muslims who are confined to work camps which mostly train them in manual and vocational
labor. If people are sorted by a certain model and receive a negative outcome, the algorithm has
claims to objectivity and secrecy which go mostly unquestioned or cannot because of heavily
guarded corporate proprietary claims. Mathematical models are also constructing an “objective”
reality and truth which can be wildly divergent from personal experience and memory; without
feedback, “a statistical engine can continue spinning out faulty and damaging analysis while
never learning from its mistakes” (O’ Neil 2016). This creates a data loop where the model is
legitimized by the machines own results proliferating highly destructive tangible consequences, a
type of mathematical model or algorithm O’ Neil coins a “weapon of math destruction” or
“WMD” (2016). All of these barriers leave people with little recursive options after being subject
to surveillance or algorithmic sorting. This violates the crucial concept of positive freedom
wherein humans are granted autonomy, self-governance, and the agency to decide what is best
for them. AI sorting in this context manipulates people “without respecting them as rational
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persons who wish to set their own goals and make their own choices” (Coekelbergh 2022).
Given the purported values for freedom and individualism in the United States, and the
authoritarian bureaucratic structure of China, the potential for abuse is apparent. Anxiety-ridden
studies that forewarn against these technologies are not sufficient so long as “technology makes
an all powerful state inevitable” (Brin 2016). Academics and activists who agitate for stricter
regulation fail to recognize that historically regulations have been weaponized against the
average person, not the institutions and forces that use them most. Brin states “not once in human
history did elites allow themselves to be blinded...it is not possible to keep useful technologies of
surveillance from those with the interest and means to acquire them” (Brin 2016). Modern digital
elites operate within a hierarchy “that allows some modicum of informed refusal at the very top”
while positioning the masses on the unequal status to refuse (Benjamin 2019). The solution is not
to cower and hide at this proliferation but rather to adapt, as Brin points out, like we always
have: he cites the panic around technologies such as the printing press and radio which
ultimately served to empower us all. Another theoretical approach to reconcile this inequity is
“digital humanism” which Helga Nowotny defines as “a vision that human values and
perspectives ought to be the starting point for the design of algorithms and AI systems that claim
to serve humanity” (2021) Hiding from this technology further incentivizes elites to better
conceal its development and use.
Notwony makes a compelling argument for understanding digital theories to help people
reconcile daily social life with these systems on a large scale. In her book In AI We Trust, she
approaches questions about the development of the digital Anthropocene or digital temporality
and explores digital understanding under capitalist modes of production and distribution. The
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scholarly understanding of the Anthropocene is “a juncture characterized by the entanglement of
human activities on the human timescale with other temporalities” (2021). The scale of human
influence on the Earth, resources, and biodiversity has increased exponentially over a certain
period of time. Historically, the roots of a digital epoch lay in the creation of nuclear power and
weaponry which relied on greater computational power. Nuclear bombs tested during this time
transformed geographical landscapes and the life around them, therefore, there is an irreversible
link between digital expansion and the modern sustainability crisis or the digital anthropocene. A
rise in technocratic power in the US and China coinciding with proliferating climate disasters
today, reflects a state anxiety over how to manage and organize the future: “digital technologies
bring the future into the present, while the sustainability crisis confronts us with the past and
challenges us to develop new capabilities for the future” (Nowotny 2021). The current body of
knowledge surrounding AI as it stands is fairly disjointed rather than interdisciplinary and takes
on different approaches, assumptions, and ultimately forecasts about the future. The alternative
to digital humanism, as defined above, is a theoretical positioning of automation as a tool for
efficiency and now places AI algorithms central to this process by rapidly increasing statistical
understanding of language and reasoning. This theory, according to Nowotny, assumes all
“unresolved problems will be sorted out by an ultimate problem-solving intelligence, a kind of
far-sighted, benign Leviathan fit to manage our worries and steer us through the conflicts and
challenges facing humanity” (2021). This foundation would expand the power exerted by
predictive algorithms and “threaten to fill the present with their apparent certainty….[if] human
behavior begins to conform to these predictions” (2021). This poses two potentially grave risks:
first that human imagination becomes limited from reliance on predictive algorithms such that
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the structure of the future is closed and pre-determined, second that predictive algorithms govern
actions so much so that human interpersonal accountability diminishes.
Digital surveillance and data driven algorithms reinforce stratification when those in
power can use them to target minority groups, however they also hold potential for heightened
inaccessibility of information which could be used for accountability. Academic, professional,
and administrative systems with built in racial and economic hierarchy which implement
technological modes of management make it much harder for the average person, who uses the
technology for convenience, to become a knowledgeable purveyor. Foucault’s analysis of the
panoptic model serves as an increasingly relevant critique on constant visibility or observation
that comes with existing in modern hierarchal society. The development of algorithmic sorting
and surveillance within the police state and functions fulfills Foucault’s theory of states as
unavoidable subject-making powers. As Nowotny argues, “if blindly followed, the predictive
power of algorithms turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy- a prediction becomes true simply
because people believe in it and act accordingly” (2021). This expansion of mechanisms of
control at a systemic level marks a reconfiguration of behavioral codes that is more insidious
than the public could have anticipated. Foucault argues that institutions outside of the state
operate through a superimposition of models which are centered around training, correction, and
transformation that produces subjects. This training needs to be coupled with constant
observation and assessments, creating a useful body of knowledge for the state and other
institutions that seek to organize or criminalize people. When institutional power and this body
of knowledge on individuals come together, it produces scientific and professional
specializations. Racially stratified access to education, and even further, access to employment as
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it pertains to digital technology and AI contributes to technocratic inequality. Silicon Valley itself
has an overwhelmingly white male hegemony yielding narrow investment in technological
innovation which focuses on a particular subset of social interests, deepening exclusion and
subordination (Benjamin 2019). This is harmful because its is not simply that “design thinking
wrongly claims newness, but in doing so erases the insights and agency of those who are
discounted because they are not designers, capitalizing on the demand for novelty across
numerous fields of action and coaxing everyone who dons the cloak of design into being seen
and heard through the dominant aesthetic of innovation” (Benjamin 2019). Predictive algorithms
have expanded beyond science and state functions and are now inextricably tied to the economy
and the social fabric. Insomuch as they can be “harnessed by the marketing and advertis[ing]
industry, instrumentalized by politicians seeking to maximize votes, and quickly adopted by the
shadowy world of secret services,” the ideology behind this transformative power is highly
distorted as a public service rather than a tool of the state or elite class (Nowotny 2021).
Therefore oppression is not an innate feature in technological development, but is more
accurately a reflection of how existing power and social hierarchies under global capitalism
shaped its production and implementation.
Conflict theorists following the marxist tradition cite performative punishment as the
unequal distribution of discipline and justice across classes where the elite class gets lighter or
even non-criminal consequences for deviance. I find this argument useful for Nowotny’s
invocation of performativity- the concept that “what is enacted, pronounced or performed can
affect action”- when describing the power of predictive algorithms. She states that this placebo
effect of predictive algorithms is simply that “an algorithm has the capability to make happen
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what it predicts when human behavior follows the prediction” (2021). If penal processes like
policing are and prisons are legitimized in their categorization of poor individuals as criminals
through the diffusion of their mechanisms in society, predictive algorithms infused with policing
data would perform this same task. Using a critical analysis of class and power dynamics
outlined above, powerful actors have a financial, political, or social investment in this
performative power which in turn makes the power of predictive algorithms very tangible and
valuable. These developments mark what Foucault considers an expansion and legitimization of
corrective mechanisms for marking individuals and a professional network in this system which
serves to expand disciplinary training to capture or “save” those who are “unassimilable” (1995).
Through Foucault we can understand how corrective and diagnostic powers to measure and
organize people develop from state management. However, Brin points to certain eccentricities
of the United States such as suspicion of authority and greater value for freedom over obedience
which create opportunities for these power dynamics to yield to inversion or a more symbiotic
relationship between this leviathan-like digital panopticism and its subjects. Scholars who
emphasize that civil entanglement with digital systems will exacerbate inequality fail to prioritize
substantive solutions to the roots of socioeconomic problems. Helga Notwony provocatively
argues that “aligning the values designed into machines with human values must be preceded by
aligning the values of corporations with those of digital humanism” (2021). Under Capitalism, a
corporation’s only social responsibility is to increase financial profit for shareholders;
destruction, oppression, and exploitation are thus logical consequences of corporate construction
and capitalist rules. If digital humanism. as defined by Nowtny, seeks to redirect this
responsibility to “human values and perspectives” it would require complete corporate
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deconstruction. Human needs directing corporate responsibility eliminates the legitimization of
individual property ownership essential to Capitalism. Corporations today continue to proliferate
and deny the sustainability and climate crisis which threatens all of human existence because if
maximizing shareholder profit requires mass death, Capitalism will kill. How can corporations
and the digital algorithmic technologies they own suddenly fulfill the values of human life if a
system of individual ownership allows the discretion to kill? Brin states that “if neo-Western
civilization has one great trick in its repertoire…that trick is accountability” especially when that
accountability reaches the wealthy and powerful” (1998). The privacy heralded in liberal society
is zealously guarded by corporations and bureaucracies which conceal algorithmic processes
because of intellectual property claims to digital technologies. We value both privacy and
accountability but paradoxically, if given the choice between the two, people demand privacy for
themselves and accountability for everyone else (Brin 1998). This is especially poignant when it
comes to Silicon Valley oligarchs who superficially support environmental regulation, healthcare
expansion, greater tax scrutiny on the rich, and governmental regulation in every other sector but
their own. Imprinting abolitionist praxis in accountability, restorative justice, and community
care as human values in algorithmic development and implementation is antithetical to hierarchal
capitalist schema, therefore; embracing digital technologies with a redistributive goal forces the
reckoning with and transformation of the capitalist infrastructure which produced it. This
comprehensive approach to digital democratization would recognize that agitating for
transparency and accountability for the most powerful would require some concessions of
privacy and transparency on our part.
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Nowotny invites us to consider the implications of digital advancement in a
growing climate and sustainability crisis. A gap exists between the public imagination and
engagement with digitized systems undertaking daily personal tasks versus complex systems
predicting impending climate catastrophe. She argues that this gap can be reconciled through
“the increasingly important role played by prediction, in particular by predictive algorithms and
analytics” (Nowotny 2021). As we further develop and understand our computational power, she
inquires “how can this knowledge be harnessed to counteract the risks we face and strengthen the
resilience of social networks”(Nowotny 2021)? The power of predictive technologies rests on
human action, or inaction, and as such must be understood within the context of their production
and consumption. While predictive analytics can be ignored they are consumed “in a digital
package that we gladly receive, but rarely see a need to unpack” while being “produced by a
system that seems impenetrable to most of us, while often jealously guarded by the large
corporations that own them” (Nowotny 2021). Predictive technologies have gained popularity in
an increasingly digitized world as a way of ascribing some level of knowability and human
control onto a turbulent future. Nowotny cites the Covid-19 pandemic as a clear example of this
technocratic and scientific approach to solutions that was soon hijacked by political motivations.
We will see how the power of predictive systems served both productive and insidious functions
during this time. The urgency of a global pandemic led to a rapid increase in data processing to
predict and chart the course of the pandemic; this overshadowed the earlier advocacy which
questioned the quality of the data that fed algorithms. State power and management can
obviously expand and contract as was shown with the contraction of bureaucracy at the
beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic. If an unequal distribution of power creates the opportunity
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for abuse or weaponization of technology against the masses, what would redistribution look
like? Resistance and civil disobedience are embedded in American jurisprudence and Hannah
Arendt argues that disobedience is a requirement on moral grounds (Coeckelbergh 2022). Brin
outlines inverted surveillance or the concept of “sousveillance” he defines as “looking back at
elites from below” as a power balancing mechanism (Brin 2016). This approach already has a
foothold in the American political imagination and has had notable legislative successes. Brin
notes the passage of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), truth in lending laws, and laws for
financial disclosures of political players. From the policing perspective, a 2013 court decision
determined citizens have a right to record police. The establishment of this right “to record
interactions with authority was an absolutely vital event; for what recourse has any average
person, when confronted by overwhelming disparity of force, other than the truth?” (Brin 2016).
He states that this law has resulted in slow changes by police because they are worried about
being watched. People experience fear or perceive risk “and multiply in a factor” relative to have
much control they have over the situation; a digital approach which allows for communal control
would quell public anxiety over tyrannical abuse of technology. With the implementation of AI,
the degrees of control get further away because not only is there a lack of control between a
policeman and the subject of policing, a predictive algorithm may even take a degree of control
out of the hands of the police which deepens anxiety and distrust. This anxiety stems from liberal
values in democracy or equal governance. As Coeckelbergh states, “AI creates new power for
the technocratic steering of society, which contrasts with democratic ideals” because it
undermines the principle of self-rule (2022). Brin’s approach subverts power dynamics while
establishing a two-way system of surveillance that can be helped by more technology not less.
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He claims that calls for worry and concern over this technology is not a very productive method
of resistance or accountability against elites because it does not maximize possible beneficial
outcomes. If individuals gain the power to surveil those who manage those systems or “apply
those lie detectors on politicians? Focus those sociopathy alerts on corporate heads? Might that
mean Big Brother...never?” (Brin 2016). However, the integration of AI technology into this
civilian system of accountability would require “fair distribution of expertise and power,
incentives need to be created for individuals to understand AI and its supply chain”
(Coeckelbergh 2022). Brin proposes an important alternative to regulation where everyday
citizens are equipped with the same technological tools as the police because people have always
found ways to integrate and adapt to daunting and transformative technological developments in
society. Does this alternative have the potential to mechanize liberation, or undo oppression if
policing has the same function? The equalization of transparency in the current digital era has the
potential to dismantle many aspects of institutional hierarchy and oppression if it can eliminate
the need for its most violent enforcers. This requires redistribution of unprecedented profit and
power through information to open the door to other institutions which exacerbate oppression,
death, or destruction and could only possibly pay with their existence. Societal or communal
consensus on what behaviors are socially harmful and worthy of communal awareness, does not
require an ideology of punishment; data driven algorithms in the abolitionist model would be
inextricably linked to radical technology of holistic, humanist care. This paper will place a
critical lens on who owns digital surveillance technology, where they are being implemented,
and the political implications of data driven algorithms for resistance movements in China and
the United States. My goal is to provide a comprehensive framework for the understanding and
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use of digital technologies to provide the general population with clear pressure points that can
be leveraged to democratize and evenly distribute the benefits of technological innovation.

Chapter 2 China- A Paragon of Digital Dominance
Introduction
It would be difficult to comprehensively understand the United States’ surveillance
models and incorporation of predictive algorithms into policing without an examination of
China’s surveillance state. China has not only successfully confined and reinforced their physical
borders, but has also managed to securitize the internet and digital experiences of their citizens.
In this chapter I argue, The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has developed the most advanced
surveillance state in the world; these unprecedented leaps in technology, implemented and
consolidated for digital national security, lend to the prospect of a Chinese surveillance model
with AI technology tuned to perfection which they use for development projects and
technological expansion abroad. As they are emerging as a global leader in AI technology, they
are in a powerful position to set legal and systemic norms for its use and implementation.
Despite the awareness of two polarized superpowers, investment in surveillance technology in
the United States and China comes from the same ideological justification: “smart city”
discourse. The smart city, as defined by Simone Tulumello, focuses on the future as a way of
managing present problems and conceptualizes “urban problems as a matter of technological and
technocratic solutions” rather than material solutions like healthcare or housing (2021). China
has made the “smart city,” using technology to develop and improve urban and social
infrastructure, a key part of its national development. Their “definition of smart city [is] initially
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assimilated to ‘safe city; and the development of surveillance networks for the state security
authorities,” emphasizing a carceral framework (Ekman and Esperanza Picardo 2020). As of
2019 they claimed to have “a total of 500 smart city pilot projects ready or under construction”
(2020). Many scholars point to China as a model for digital authoritarianism where technology is
used “by authoritarian governments not only to control, but to shape, the behavior of its citizens
via surveillance, repression, manipulation, censorship, and the provision of services in order to
retain and expand political control” (Khalil 2020). I argue that despite different socio-political
foundations for the implementation of algorithms in the US and China, the roots of digital
oppression lie in uneven power structures which purport scientific or mathematical “analogies
that ease the transmission of ideas while stripping them of the context in which they arise”
(Nowtny 2021). Given the undeniable global influence of this polity, it is difficult to imagine a
surveillance model without a foundation for algorithmic oppression through unfettered exercise
of power through data and surveillance technology. We will discover the significance of specific
domestic and international projects developed to further China’s technological reach.
The framework for the Chinese digital state as well as one of the greatest and daunting
technological achievements has been the Great Firewall, operational since the early 2000s and
controlled by The Cyberspace Administration of China or (CAC). This internet structure is a
sovereign “interconnected system of laws and regulations that determines acceptable and
prohibited content” (Khalil 2020). This is when the international community began to take
China’s goal for dominance in the information and communication technology (IT) sector very
seriously. They have an expansive surveillance network within the borders, implemented as
anti-crime and anti-terrorism initiatives, which includes more than 200 million closed circuit
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cameras providing data to programs like SkyNet, a police monitoring system, or Sharp Eyes
which links cameras from smartphones, vehicles, and personal appliances with surveillance
cameras (Khalil 2020). After fortifying their surveillance structure, China personally invested in
a digital aspect of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), called the Digital Silk Road (DSR) which
has “generated US $17 billion in loans and investments in telecom networks, mobile payment
systems, and projects such as smart cities, e-government, smart education, digital health, and
other big data initiatives throughout the developing world” reaching about 80 countries (Khalil
2020). These systems transcend borders and national spaces because the “body is not simply
seen, but is now an entity onto which all sorts of information are attached” (Rosier 2018).
Through this initiative, “Chinese companies secure legal rights to data collected via Chinese tech
embedded in infrastructure projects;” they are not only recreating their framework in other
countries, but creating a network for data to travel to their centralized digital core, reinforcing
their role as a leader in the sector (Khalil 2020). These projects have an emphasis on China
establishing an international foothold however, I argue the shift from material infrastructure
investments like railroads and dams to digital surveillance technology fueled by algorithms and
data growing and innovating at exponential rates, creates increasingly carceral solutions for
vulnerable communities which have little recourse. Facial recognition leads in Artificial
Intelligence (AI) technology with over 7,837 facial recognition firms in the state (Beraja et. al
2021). We will look at the implications of this extensive carceral organization system through
China’s development of their Social Credit System, their intensive digital repression in the
Xinjiang region, and the state management of the Covid-19 pandemic.
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China invested in and innovated surveillance technology systems to provide data for
China’s comprehensive and controversial Social Credit System (SCS). The SCS is both a
technological database and governance regime with the goal to boost society’s integrity and
stability through incentives and punishments based on individual's behavior in social, political
and economic spheres or interactions with the judicial system (Chen, Lin and Liu 2018). The
technology and algorithmic sorting used by the SCS require an extensive amount of training data
to develop accuracy; Beraja and others point to the shareability of data and suggest access to
massive amounts of “government data has contributed to Chinese firms’ emergence as leading
innovators in facial recognition AI technology” (2018). The state is extremely data rich both
because complete digital transparency has been integrated within its larger political ideology and
the CCP ensures that all private companies are open or at least have backdoors for government
access; the Study Strong China App, required for party members, has over 100 million users and
the government monitors their “progress and activity” (Groot 2020). The authoritarian
government that allows access to limitless data is not as fundamental to the sector or detrimental
to the public as the normalization of one-sided operational transparency found in many countries
with surveillance and algorithm systems. We will see these various methods of constant
monitoring and predictive policing reach brutally repressive levels in the Xinjiang province
where the Chinese population of Uyghur Muslims have been sequestered in reeducation camps
to see how the technology can be sharpened as a weapon against targeted groups The reach of
the SCS was consolidated in 2014 allowing for implementation of more invasive security
technologies in Xinjiang around the same time. This huge system has allowed for advantages
like data being used to automate contract tracing, however, the Covid-19 pandemic has allowed
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China to expand its surveillance and normalize its authoritarian practices under the guise of
controlling the virus. The pandemic itself created a crisis of information and even though the
public demonstrated unique instances of dissatisfaction and resistance to government
management and the technological ecosystem, there is no state precedent for digital transparency.
I find that China’s centralized authoritarian technology allowed them to censor or punish
dissenters during the pandemic which was legitimized and normalized by state claims to national
security and public health management. They used their digital strength to manage the virus,
information, and oversee pandemic guidelines while also exporting the technology abroad.
Through a study of China’s surveillance technology programs, we can examine China’s
role and digital goals on the international stage. Even though, as of 2020, “China makes only
16% of the chips supporting its technological development,” the state is rich in data and training
resources which is ultimately the key to greater algorithmic sophistication and innovation
(Feldstein 2019). Steven Feldstein further argues that the People's Republic of China or (PRC)
“is seeking to transform its chip-manufacturing capacity through investment and
intellectual-property theft in order to dominate a core set of high- tech industries” (2019). China
is aggressively investing in this technological advancement; the state’s leadership frame it as the
“new impetus for advancing supply-side structural reforms, a new opportunity for rejuvenating
the real economy, and a new engine for building China into both a manufacturing and cyber
superpower” (Feldstein 2019). Scholars in the United States frame this as a dystopia of digital
authoritarianism, however; interestingly, these innovations were implemented because of
agitation from the bottom up; the government commissioned digital infrastructure within social
services to reconcile the public sentiment of diminishing trust, safety, and cooperation in
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communal life. In many ways, China’s digital infrastructure reflects the social needs of their
national majority; the public does not express the same anxiety about digital oppression as
Westerners, so where do the tensions arise? In China’s racial structure, their digital surveillance
and algorithm models reinforce the image of the majority by targeting their capabilities at
minorities “trapped between regimes of invisibility and hypervisibility” (Benjamin 2019). The
tremendous efforts to develop a self-sufficient domestic model of surveillance from production
to execution is driven by the unprecedented amounts of data being funneled into an extremely
streamlined database controlled by the state. Internationally, they market success using
surveillance systems as a tool for countering terrorism and crime, expanding their reach through
the BRI. One of these facial recognition programs was exported from China to Zimbabwe to
track millions of their citizens. Officials and public agencies in Zimbabwe can benefit from the
managerial benefits of digital surveillance, while China builds a more comprehensive database of
different ethnicities. If the greatest expansion of digital systems is in the institutions of crime and
immigration control, diversity in the data sets algorithms are trained on would just more
accurately funnel people into these unjust social mechanisms. It would reflect a technocratic
approach to neocolonial extraction in the digital age “in which the people whose faces populate
the database have no rights vis-a-vis the data systems that are built around their biometric input”
(Benjamin 2019). This critical perspective helps to understand both the Chinese surveillance
model and the problems that arise from calls for a “western” democratic model to counter it. This
popular media and scholarly perspective coming out of the US is complicated by with this
account of similarities in carceral logics driven by economic markets and state commitment to
racial hierarchy.
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Chinese Social History and the Conception of Digital Infrastructure:
Unlike the United States, the Chinese government is a key facilitator, and unavoidable
intermediary during every step of surveillance technology development and implementation.
However, Chinese citizens place significantly greater trust in the centralized government than
local communities or neighbors as arbiters of justice and purveyors of public good; The Social
Credit System or SCS, particularly, demonstrates the state’s attempt to mitigate this lack of social
trust within its borders. It is considered a diversion from the traditional Chinese mantra of
“governing the country in accordance with the law” towards a new regime of “rule of trust”
(Chen, Lin, and Liu 2018). Rule of trust is “a governance mode that imposes arbitrary
restrictions-loosely defined and broadly interpreted trust-related rules- to condition, shape, and
compel the behavior of governed subjects,” an effort according to the Chen, Lin, and Liu,
attempts to fill an ideological void in the Chinese Communist Party (2018). As of 2019, the SCS
system has not used artificial intelligence technologies, “ real time data or automated decisions”
nor has it “reached the stage where each individual is given a numeric ‘score’ as such in
determining the person’s social status,” which has been misleadingly reported in US media
(Chen, Lin, and Liu 2018). Development of the national Social Credit System, beginning in
2002, was primarily a financial resource for businesses and individuals that paved the way for
the SCS today. It extended into the social sector with public complaints of “trust-breaking” and
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“credit information barriers” in society that the SCS was equipped to address through integration
and consolidation of information on individuals from other government agencies (2018).
Eventually the State Council issued a plan in 2014 to build a social credit project to enhance
society’s integrity and establish credit standards beyond the financial sector.
The first step in consolidation was assigning every individual a “social credit unified
code” or SC unicode: an 18-digit code from identity cards that link to personal data, including
income, tax and social insurance payments, and financial registration information (2018). The
purpose of this data is to identify those who break trust or violate legal rules, civil regulations,
and even traffic laws: the result is a Black list of 23 million “trust -breaking” organizations or
individuals as of 2020, and a Red list for “trust-keepers” (2018). Many city governments such as
“Honest Shanghai” have established their “own credit websites to promote the SCS and to share
data with agencies at the provincial, municipal and county levels” (2018). The distinction of
what is considered trust breaking is very vague and the violations are not always criminal
according to the law: spreading rumors on the internet is considered trust breaking and in the
Henan Province “rejecting university admission after passing the national exam...is seen as a
‘trust breaking’ act” (2018). Chen, Lin and Liu’s argument makes it clear that this idea of trust
erodes the previous tradition of rule of law because the norms of trust are vague and broadening
with no clear standards or restrictions for individual or social behavior. Red list individuals enjoy
benefits like faster government services and less bureaucratic control like inspections. The
mission behind Black lists is “trust breaking here, restrictions everywhere;” they are utilized by
the “judicial, tax, customs, security supervision, environmental protection, safety inspection,
transportation authorities,” and more (2018). The most expansive is the nationalized “Defaulters
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list,” with 9.59 million individuals by the end of 2017, who have not complied with court
judgements, which restricts “government procurement, bid tendering, administrative approvals,
government support, financing credit, market access and determination of qualifications'' (2018).
This, in turn, affects their work and social life as this information is made public. Chinese
concepts around shaming, trust, and governance through reward and punishment are rooted in
many generations before digitization. We will look at specific examples of the more insidious
and inescapable form these concepts have taken with the help of surveillance algorithms later on.
Historically, however, there is a cultural emphasis on Confusian ideas of loyalty to the family
and the state but not to strangers. Paradigms of technology were integrated within those cultural
and political ideals through databases and social media platforms with hundreds of millions of
users that share this vast data with the SCS. The social credit system of China has been
characterized by western discourse as undemocratic by “excluding, punishing, and
discrimination certain individuals or groups,” but categorization and social sorting are not new in
the West (Rosier 2018). On the other hand, there was an expression of shock and awe in the
sensational tone of the discourse at the expansiveness of such an advanced system being
implemented in such a densely populated nation. One of the major questions that has not been
made public to the world or to China’s own citizens is how criteria are used to organize people.
Citizen’s behaviors have only been given point values that culminate into an overall social score
on a local level, such as Shanghai and Rongcheng in the Shandong province.
The only regulations for data collection were implemented through the Cybersecurity
Law in 2017 against individuals and private businesses, not the government itself; “in fact, many
laws and policies in China, keenly seek to facilitate, rather than deter, the government’s control
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of personal data” (2018). The effectiveness of SCS in restoring social trust does not outweigh its
consequences because “the label of ‘trust-breaking’ generates new government-backed sanctions
for behavior not originally condemned in the legal system, thus blurring the line between social,
moral norms, legal norms wherein the “rule of trust” often trumps the traditional “rule of
law”(2018). The SCS in its current form also “makes already disadvantaged groups more
vulnerable to additional punishments, which is a departure from the principle of equality before
the law” (Chen, Lin, and Liu 2018). And lastly, because the SCS is used by multiple government
agencies, this compounds punishments for broad violations that go beyond what would be
imposed in the case of individual violation of law. The SCS also restricts due process and a right
to legally challenge sanctions. The only hope for an individual to be removed is for the court to
remedy or recognize an error with no personal statement. The SCS’s complex web of sanctions
for an individual’s violation extends to employment, transportation and even their family; they
also extend beyond its borders. Government efforts to expand data collection have gone without
significant public resistance possibly because the SCS had a role in reducing fraud such as “tax
evasion, non-compliance with court-ordered payments, food-safety violations” and more (2018).
China has also managed to control the media narrative blaming mostly private companies for
privacy concerns. The SCS has flourished as a convenient governance tool under China’s
authoritarian state. However, it is the unregulated and rampant data collection from a structure of
carceral “state control, unjustified social exclusion and discrimination” as well as “shrinking
space for privacy, and the erosion of due process” that can be found in the democratic machine of
the US as well as China that creates algorithmic oppression and a grim comparative future for
surveillance under capitalism.
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Surveillance and Algorithmic Repression: Xinjiang
Any fear or anxiety around the political implications of China’s surveillance state reaches
a zenith when one takes the Xinjiang region into account. However, the distinct digital repression
exercised in this region cannot be dissociated from the social power and role of policing to
maintaining hierarchies and expand forms of punitive control. The nationalized SCS has
garnered a lot of attention but has not incorporated any standardized applications of predictive
algorithms. This region serves as the intersection of all of China’s technologic and predictive
algorithm capabilities with an immense occupational police presence targeted at a single
minority group. The implementation of AI into this system is insidious because it can “not only
monitor individuals’ whereabouts and online behavior,” but can be developed “to map their
relationships through link analysis, to discern their intentions or emotions using sentiment
analysis, and to infer their past or future locations and actions for the purpose of regime
maintenance;” this province can be considered an absolute model of digital authoritarianism
(Khalil 2020). Not only are Uyghur Muslims subject to gruesome human rights abuses, they are
well documented among an international community that is mostly inactive. The historical
framework for China’s counterterrorism efforts may be similar to other nation-states attempts to
reinforce national security like the post 9/11 shift towards increased border security; however,
examining the Xinjiang province specifically, China has an irrevocable economic presence that
has not only legitimized the state’s most extreme domestic surveillance model, but also the
exportation of this counterterrorism method of surveillance to other countries. The United States
does little to interfere with China’s authoritarian repression of Uyghur Muslims or the trade of
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their technological services. This is because in many ways, the United States is extremely
dependent on Chinese exports and economic infrastructure, therefore; the extreme forms of
digital oppression which occupy this region cannot be fully comprehended outside the market
interactions of global capitalism. The Strike Hard campaign of 2014 is known as a key expansion
of surveillance mechanisms in the Xinjiang region. The result is the largest population of an
estimated one million incarcerated Muslims, particularly of Turkish ethnicity, in the world in
China. This domestic counterterrorism strategy and goal began in the 1990s as well as Strike
Hard “anti-crime operations to assure the public of the state’s ability to provide security” against
China’s “three evil forces: separatism, terrorism, and extremism” (Byman and Saber 2019). The
effects of 9/11 also reverberated worldwide with a shift in Strike Hard Campaigns towards
“illegal religious activity and separatist ideas” in China (2019). As the definition of security has
incorporated digital spaces, these ideological and political programs have sharpened a dangerous
and often violent technological edge with the development of an extremely repressive police
state in Xinjiang “that essentially monitors residents every move” (Byman and Saber 2019).
The intensive technological repression in this province is authorized and normalized
through State claims to domestic security and counter terrorism measures to an “evolving and
militant threat” (Soliev 2021). The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an independent
Xinjiang independence and separatist movement, with a more radical sect called TIM, East
Turkestan Education and Solidarity Association (ETESA), Uyghur led and based is Istanbul, and
the World Uyghur Congress, an advocacy group based in Germany, are all muslim organizations
with various terrorist classifications and ties to the Xinjiang region. However, Byman and Saber
state that “much of what China considers terrorism at home...appears to involve individuals or
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small groups rather than larger organizations” citing specific incidents of fatal political violence.
(Byman and Saber 2019). There was a notable clash in 2009 the CCP blamed on the World
Uyghur Congress: in Urumqi after two Uighurs died during a conflict between Uighur workers
and Han Chinese, “over 1,000 rioted...resulting in more than 150 dead and over 1,000 injured”
(2019). In 2014, at the Kunming train station, “eight Uighurs armed with knives killed 29 and
injured 140” (2019). Within May of 2014 “a suicide bomber killed 39 at a market in Urumqi”
and “one Uighur also armed with a knife injured six at a train station in Guanzhou” (2019). A
government compound in Xinjiang was attacked in February of 2017 “when three Uighurs
detonated a bomb outside” resulting in five deaths. (2019) Sweeping counterrorism legislation
then passes in 2015, a standalone law, that “gives the government broad authorities and vaguely
defines terrorism and extremism so as to encompass a broad range of actions that the regime
fears would threaten domestic stability” (Byman and Saber 2019). The law does not allow the
media to report “on counterterrorism without government approval”and requires that AI and
internet companies contribute to counterterrorism efforts “including with decryption and limits
foreign access” to China’s (ICT) or information and communications technology (Byman and
Saber 2019). It has received both domestic and international criticism for lack of judicial
oversight, “allowing for individuals to be sent to education centers after prison sentences without
clarifying the circumstances under which that can occur, and mobilizing members of the public
against targeted groups through the creation of villager committees” (Byman and Saber 2019).
Chinese surveillance mechanisms in Xinjiang “escalated to include internment camps,
forced labor, and daily indoctrination programs,” and the government expanded into biometric
data collection such as “DNA, fingerprints, iris scans, and even gait” (Byman and Saber 2019).
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Their surveillance has heavily focused on carceral solutions to violence boasting that they have
“punished over 30,000 people for illegal religious activity,” actions that could be viewed as
“legitimate religious observance or political action in other countries” are criminalized in the
region. This looks like banning a range of arbitrary actions like wearing “clothes that supposedly
advocate extremism” or even “storing large amounts of food or suddenly quitting drinking and
smoking” (Byman and Saber 2019). Any action that could be perceived as a potential harm to
stability can result in exorbitant fines or incarceration. The activities of XinJiang residents is
monitored and assessed for threat through a mobile app called the Integrated Joint Operations
Platform or (IJOP) which “collects personal information on all Xinjiang residents, not just
Turkish Muslims, and links it to the individual’s identification number,” tracking location and
other information as well. However, only “knives purchased by Uighurs have the purchasers’
identification data etched onto the blades as QR codes” (Byman and Saber 2019). The IJOP app
“notifies officials when an individual needs to be investigated” and even “provides officials with
specific questions to ask during interrogations'' (Byman and Saber 2019). Although this is most
prevalent in XinJiang, it continues to be exported to other parts of China, especially regions like
Tibet, with larger minority ethnic populations. Authorities are alerted when people under
suspicion “venture more than 300 meters from their homes, workplaces, or other approved
areas;” their connections and potential abilities to travel overseas are heavily monitored as well
(Byman and Saber 2019).
The CCP secretary Chen Quangua first used the paramilitary grid system in Tibet before
becoming “the mastermind behind the [Xinjiang] region’s surveillance and re-education
programs” (Byman and Saber 2019). The Sinicization or reeducation program is meant to
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legitimize state oversight and control over “ethnic and religious affairs”. China has more than
one million Uighurs and other Muslims in these camps and “another two million forced to attend
daytime political indoctrination programs” (Byman and Saber 2019). These operations hail from
a decades-long governmental effort to “bring economic prosperity to minority-majority regions”
that might work “to quell separatist impulses, beginning with Xinjiang” (Byman and Saber
2019). The programs implemented since, have sought to manipulate the region’s demographics
and erase many public aspects of traditional Muslim culture. The population of Han Chinese in
the region has grown from 7% to 40% from 1949 to today (Byman and Saber 2019). The
government promotes ethnic inter-marraige with monetary incentives, however, there is darker
evidence that “Uighur women [are] being forced to marry Han men in exchange for freeing male
relatives held in the internment camps” (Byman and Saber 2019). The CCP claims that the
centers are focused on economic uplift to “turn the Uighur population into an industrial
workforce to help lift them out of poverty” (Byman and Saber 2019). They have since legally
formalized the camps with the goal of restricting Islam “within the confines of traditional
Chinese culture...and make it more compatible with socialism” (Byman and Saber 2019).
Detainees in camps are forced into a curriculum “reciting Chinese laws and Communist Party
policies, learning Mandarin, singing songs about the CCP, and Xi Jinping, and renouncing
religious beliefs” and face harsh interrogations or torture if they do not comply. Outside of camps
they are still required to “attend weekly or daily flag-raising ceremonies, Mandarin classes, and
political indoctrination meetings during which they are obligated to praise the CCP and condemn
their families” (Byman and Saber 2019). The Chinese government has even banned clothing and
outward affiliations with Islam “this includes banning the veil, fasting for Ramadan, and certain
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beards; restricting pilgrimages to Mecca; and even issuing a list of banned names because of
their association with Islam” (Byman and Saber 2019). This cultural restriction goes even further
as children are banned from learning about or participating in religious activity in school or at
home. The government has even demolished traditional Islamic centers and mosques in towns
like Hasgar and converted them to recreational centers and restaurants. The state control over
accepted categories of behavior without public insight into what information determines these
categories is the key to surveillance repression.
As of July 2019 Shohrat Zakir, the governor of Xinjiang, claimed the majority of these
groups had been released and “ more than 90 percent of the discharged people had found decent
jobs with local industries and manufacturing factories;” despite this, it is still unclear how many
people remain in the labor camps (Soliev 2021). There is virtually no way for journalists to
confirm these claims because their operations are concealed under state classifications. There is
also still significant government control and oversight in these facilities and limited contact with
family leaving questions about continued forced labor and continued human rights abuses.
Sometimes contact is impossible because “most of their children have been placed in ‘child
welfare’ institutions and boarding schools to learn the Chinese language and ‘better life habits’”
(Soliev 2021). The long term success of this overarching campaign is yet to be determined,
however Soliev argues that “militant groups have framed the Chinese detentions as oppression”
The China State Council Information Office issued a paper in March 2019 revealing “authorities
in Xinjiang had arrested nearly 13,000 terrorists and broken up over 1,500 violent and terrorist
gangs since 2014” as well as 2,000 confiscated explosive devices in the region (Soliev 2021).
Despite these claims, “the majority of Uyghurs who have traveled to Southeast Asia in recent
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years appear to be peaceful asylum seekers” fleeing China and traveling through Malaysia and
Thailand in attempts to reach Turkey, the home of a large Uyghur community (Soliev 2021).
Calls for greater transparency in the region particularly from the U.N. are criticized for political
motivations that “maintain a double standard in how they choose to label terrorist attacks in
China versus the Middle East” (Byman and Saber 2019). This is fairly true as the United States,
the most powerful U.N. member, “sees the Uighurs and other Muslim communities as oppressed
when it gives them any thought at all” and “prioritizes terrorism in the greater Middle East”
(Byman and Saber 2019). Fear of China’s economic retaliation was made clear when 22 mostly
western states signed a letter on July 2019 calling on China to respect human rights, but not a
single country would take credit for leading the effort; furthermore 37 states “primarily Middle
Eastern and African states...submitted a letter commending China’s human rights achievements
and the success of its counterterrorism program” (Byman and Saber 2019). Thus, China’s
strategy of counterterrorism has been legitimized within the neoliberal international parameters
concerning human rights, despite evidence to the contrary, because their digital sovereignty
allows for complete technological discretion and their international influence discourages
pushback. Both factors are crucial to the state’s surveillance advancement and promotional goals.

COVID-19 Pandemic
The CCP has responded to the spread of a global pandemic by utilizing large amounts of
citizens' data and activity in collaboration with The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)
to not only control the Corona virus but to control the narrative about the government's
management, considering the international blame for the crisis. Many scholars point to expansion
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of an already worrisome model of digital authoritarianism wherein criticism is met with “further
censorship and propaganda both within China and through external diplomatic efforts” while
dissenters are arrested and detained (Khalil 2020). The spread of the Covid-19 pandemic has also
led to an increase in and consolidation of digital authoritarian functions like AI “surveillance
cameras, drones, facial recognition technology, big data collection and analysis, tracking apps,
and QR codes linking travel history and medical data” (Ekman and Esperanza Picardo 2020).
Companies developed health apps to determine risk and cameras were installed outside homes or
apartment buildings to deter people from breaking quarantine while the CAC effectively
suppressed any criticism of quarantine restrictions or government accountability and
transparency by removing or blocking posts (Khalil 2020). Cyber sovereignty and centralized
government control over internet governance and surveillance development were crucial aspects
of this digital authoritarianism that reached new levels under the cover of pandemic measures.
The need to control a global pandemic both “stalled an emerging public debate on personal data
protection” and has provided a “proof of concept” demonstrating that surveillance technology
works on an extensive scale (Khalil 2020). More interestingly, a comparative study of
information governance in China’s mainland versus Hong Kong during the early stages of the
pandemic emphasizes the necessity and the possibility for digital transparency, especially during
times of crisis when the consequences are compounded.
When the pandemic first spread in 2019, information spread on social media was
dismissed as rumor; public information about controlling the outbreak in mainland China did not
become available until the General Secretary of the CCP, Xi Jinping, made an announcement
about guidelines on January, 20th 2020 (Ding and Lin 2021). A doctor at the Wuhan Central
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Hospital in China, Ai Fen, was reprimanded by hospital authorities for “spreading rumors” and
“harming stability” for trying to warn colleagues and staff about the coronavirus early on in
December 2019 (Khalil 2020). Another doctor’s death, Dr Li, sparked outrage expressed through
Chinese online platforms about government censorship. They were quickly removed “with the
help of artificial intelligence-powered search engine tools” and “the same internet police that
silenced Dr Li were efficiently dispatched to pursue netizens who had written critically about the
Chinese government’s handling of the outbreak and DR Li’s treatment” (Khalil 2020). Around
897 people were detained or punished for their online activity as it relates to the Covid-19 virus.
This has gone as far as companies “deleting or blocking posts from people who write about
family members getting sick, ask for donations or assistance online, or give eyewitness accounts
of overwhelming conditions at hospitals” (Khalil 2020). The lack of digital transparency
intensified the effects of pandemic while undermining social stability.
Ding and Lin characterize how technological ecosystems operated during the pandemic:
mainland China employed “information authoritarianism” while Hong Kong experienced
“information anarchy” (2020). Even though both systems “failed to deliver accurate and reliable
information to the public due to the spread of disinformation or misinformation,” the Hong Kong
government disclosed information regularly and allowed people to share information as they
pleased (Ding and Lin 2021). The greater digital freedom in Hong Kong, plagues the region with
polarized media, low trust in government, and “social media misinformation;” therefore, the
local government is more willing to sacrifice government power and the illusion of social
stability, compared to governments in the Wuhan and Hubei province, for greater transparency
and to guarantee individual rights. I argue that the proliferation or oppression of surveillance
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technology in China and elsewhere is fueled by the normalization of zero state transparency. This
is made especially clear through an examination of the different information management
systems of mainland China and Hong Kong. Ding and Lin characterize the weeks from
December 2019 to January 19th as “Phase I;” they argue local government officials in Wuhan
and Hubei controlled and politicized any mention of cases to maintain social stability during the
annual political meetings of local governments called“two sessions” and the Lunar New Year, a
large Chinese festival (2021). They spread the false claim that “there were only a limited number
of confirmed cases, no medical staff infected, and no human-to-human transmission and that the
outbreak was under control” (Ding and Lin 2021). Wuhan authorities did not seriously
investigate cases first reported on December 8, 2019 until December 31; afterwards they
controlled release of pandemic information related to cases around government events. In Ding
and Lin’s analysis of information governance in Hong Kong they frame “Phase I” from late
December to January 22nd and “Phase II” as the 23rd until the end of February. Unlike the strict
control of the CCP in the mainland, “the Hong Kong government has maintained an open
information practice and regularly updated the situation of the outbreak outside Hong Kong in
Phase I” (Ding and Lin 98). They issued public health notices when information about outbreaks
in Wuhan first reached them. The Center for Health Protection or (CHP) and the Secretary for
Food and Health (SFH) took many preventive measures including strengthening “inspection and
quarantine at all ports of entry to Hong Kong and promoted public education on disease
prevention” and continually updated information on cases detected in mainland China, Japan,
Taiwan and Thailand (Ding and Lin 2021). Hong Kong’s government has the same technological
capabilities and surveillance systems as the mainland; however, their management of the
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pandemic lends to the prospect of a transparent, albeit less organized, surveillance state that is
not at odds with individual freedoms.
After Xi's declaration of official pandemic measures on January 20th, media and news
reports in the mainland surged from 28 on the day of the announcement to 241 the following day,
and only increased from there. Critical state reporting tended to focus on local government
officials’ handling of the pandemic and “commercial media followed suit: several investigative
reports criticized local officials’ malfeasance and demanded political accountability” (Ding and
Lin 2021). The state government effectively retained control over what was worthy of reporting
and worthy of accountability. The lack of transparency in the mainland allowed for some state
control and redirection of public indignation. The CCP and local governments in the mainland
incorporated “Phase II” into their pandemic management: “on 21 January...the Central and local
governments began to release information on a daily basis regarding COVID-19 statistics and
details of confirmed cases,” which was previously buried (Ding and Lin 2021). They introduced
strict lockdown measures by January 29th and began using digital health codes to “facilitate
reopening” (Ding and Lin 2021). Hong Kong entered their “Phase II” after two imported cases of
Covid-19 were confirmed on January 23rd, the government activated the highest emergency
level on the 25th. They also kept the public up to date with daily information about pandemic
governmental management and the spread through press conferences or online platforms such as
the CHP’s online Covid-19 dashboard. Ding and Lin state that “Hong Kong has an open and free
media system structurally and cherishes freedom of press as an important core value of the
society” (2021). They followed the Covid virus closely, both locally and globally, interviewing
scientists and experts while also highlighting or criticizing the government response. Operating
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under less censorship, they could more readily challenge disinformation from the mainland and
take a more critical stance towards officials. A “pro-democracy centrist” newspaper, called Ming
Pao for example, reported on January 5th “that the Jinyintan Hospital of Wuhan disallowed
medical staff to take leave in order to handle a sharply rising number of infection cases, which
never appeared in Mainland media” (Ding and Lin 2021). Through information transparency,
citizens were guaranteed more methods of recourse and resistance to government measures that
proved effective. The importance of this in combatting the pandemic was emphasized and
published by scholars and media in Hong Kong. During “Phase II” the political polarization of
the public began to as there were many contentious debates around banning visitors from
Mainland China from traveling to Hong Kong, shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE),
particularly face masks, and quarantine and screening sites designated by the government (Ding
and Lin 2021). Many locals organized and participated in protests and strikes around certain
government measures; the outcry for face masks even “pushed the government to carry out a
local mask production subsidy scheme” (Ding and Lin 2021). Government services in Hong
Kong were driven by the public’s perception while the mainland focused on guiding public
perception in support of state services.
Despite instances of criticism and resistance of the mainland government from the public
on IT platforms, “the strict censorship on conventional news media and institutionalized
governance over social media significantly offset such empowerment” (Ding and Lin 2021). The
mainland’s information system was ultimately ineffective because “rumors as resistance” were
used to battle against government disinformation and misinformation spread. Hong Kong’s
consistently open information system sparked both public debate and collective action resulting
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in “information anarchy” because “the media and the public have the freedom to produce and
disseminate pandemic information” (Ding and Lin 2021). The public in Hong Kong, because of
digital information transparency, asserts significantly more checks and balances on their
government than the people of mainland China. Therefore while surveillance technology is
becoming increasingly unavoidable or repressive during catastrophe, there are also models and
opportunities for resistance or accountability through transparency. China has not been alone in
its use and promotion of surveillance technologies to curtail the pandemic with many
democracies such as Australia, Taiwan, and India implementing Covid tracing and protection
apps out of which “only 12 countries have introduced systems that meet the full five-star criteria,
in that they are voluntary, have limits on how the data is used, require that data is not retained,
minimize data collection, and are transparent in design and use (Khalil 2020). This framework
for concealed or “black box” surveillance is not unique to China and as a result neither is the
potential for algorithmic oppression.

Conclusion China’s Global Vision
President Xi Jinping has promoted the vision of a “digital panopticon” in China, which is
an “all-seeing digital system of social control, patrolled by precog [future vision] algorithms that
identify potential dissenters in real time” (Khalil 2020). Institutions and companies such as the
National IT Development Strategy, Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, Made in China 2025, and China
Standards 2035 have helped position China to achieve that goal and “define global technological
standards and to...project the CCP’s geostrategic goals” (Khalil 2020). The influence of China as
a technological leader is clear given the role of the SCS has spillover effects outside the Chinese
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border. Businesses hoping to establish a foothold “during the course of business
registration...will receive an SC unicode and become subjects of the SCS,” foreign airlines and
NGO’s are included within SCS databases and their behavior is categorized by trust (Chen, Lin,
and Liu 2021). They also use passports and other travel documents for foreign actors to
determine a social credit and even require commercial companies such as Airbnb to “proactively
hand over information on foreign guests to government authorities, including their passport
numbers and dates of stay” (Chen, Lin, and Liu 2021). China has pushed private companies to
seek international contracts because they are “key for the national economy and continue to
move up the value chain and for generating new sources of growth through their
internationalism” (Ekman and Esperanza Picardo 2020). They continue to heavily invest in these
technologies and have now become the world’s largest supplier of surveillance technology
according to The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Groot 2020). Companies like
Huaweii, Hikvision, Duhua, and ZTE currently present themselves “as a ‘leading provider of
Safe City and Smart City solutions’ and, by the end of the 2019, Huaweii had signed 73 ‘safe
city agreements for surveillance products or services across 52 countries,” like Serbia and the
Philippines (Ekman and Esperanza Picardo 2020). The AI startup Cloudwalk Technology signed
a contract with Zimbabwe’s government “to provide facial-recognition technology for use by
state-security services” (Feldstein 2019). This influence, however, is limited in the EU. Beyond
donating technology under what they consider an “anti-epidemic” model, China also promotes
their smart city systems through educational training programs and lectures for engineers,
government officials, and business professionals from developed countries especially. They
emphasize the security, political, and social benefits beyond the pandemic for all countries. The
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Bureau of Industry and Security in the US (BIS) has banned US firms from doing business with
particular Chinese tech and surveillance companies like Huaweii yet, “a number of U.S
companies are contributing to the development and entrenchment of China’s surveillance
program” (Byman and Saber 2019). U.S internet companies are also given the controversial
choice between fulfilling “China’s wishes on surveillance and content or push for free speech
that may be exploited by communities China accuses of being linked to terrorism” according to
Byman and Saber (2019). Many companies have chosen the former seeing as China effectively
built a network “of capitalist gold valued information of citizens, wanted by governments,
accordingly to generate security and protection for individuals, or to support the power structure
of authoritarian surveillance practices” (Rosier 2018). This international network of surveillance
oppression fueled by limitless access to data, legitimized by state claims to classified security,
and reinforced through carceral force and international power is chilling; however, more
alarming is that these political foundations for algorithmic abuse are present in the United States.
Marking these notable similarities within this comparative study I argue that the United
States will more likely double down on the technocratic solutions of surveillance technology for
a liberal “democratic” model of surveillance use. The proliferation of China’s repressive state
through these technologies has not yet been a reckoning that leads to greater transparency and
regulations in capitalist democracies, but rather confirms their success as tools of social control.
Much of the United States’ technological and strategic development after 9/11 is done within an
orientalist structure of relative positioning. Orientalism, within the American context, is the
recognition or construction of a Japanese, Korean, and Indochinese other in order to develop a
deeper understanding or connection to cultural goals and ideals (Said 1978). From an academic
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and political perspective it is the accepted “basic distinction between East and West as the
starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social, descriptions, and political accounts
concerning the Orient, its people, customs, ‘mind,’ destiny, and so on” (Said 1978). I do not want
to fall into the orientalist trap of othering China but rather reflect on its development as a lens
into surveillance “perfection”. This country has its own extensive history of mass incarceration
of minority groups as well as expansive surveillance mechanisms used against suspected
communists and black freedom movements during Cold War McCarthyism through
COINTELPRO. Ideals surrounding democracy or human rights have historically been
undermined in the US during social upheaval to control and delegitimize the state’s political
opposition. Predictive policing reproduces these historical injustices rather than improves
security. Western discourse on China as a method of reflection and communication is utilized to
construct and reveal a dystopian reality through political media and scholarship. It is generally
very negative and highly critical, reflecting the “SCS as a thoroughly negative and worrisome
development for China’s citizens” that induces “anxiety around the world” (Rosier 2018). It is
often described as Orweillan or similar to dystopian stories depicted in Netflix’s Black Mirror.
In the west, however, the proliferation of these technologies is much more silent with citizens'
personal data being framed as an “economic good” volunteered by consumers. Rosier argues that
“this justifies the creation of the ‘transparent citizen’ and creates a neoliberal world order” where
the collection and trade of private data is not considered a human rights violation (2018). China’s
investment in technological development has yielded them significant profit and economic
success which the United States is heavily invested in as well. People in the US engage on the
internet and sites through social media or “cookies” used by private companies to collect
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information which may “contribute to production of neoliberal subjects who approach the world
through the eyes of consumers rather than those of citizens entitled to rights” (Rosier 2018).
Thus, the normalization of government and corporate discretion over digital transparency is just
as insidious in the United States surveillance model as the authoritarian regime in China.
According to Byman and Saber, the United States and other liberal democracies “are still
setting the global counterterrorism agenda” to a degree, however, “China has found opportunity
to independently strengthen ties with that states face terrorism threats” (2019). They have been
very successful in promoting this extensive and repressive use of technology as a
counterterrorism model abroad in Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, and other countries in sub
Saharan Africa by using “its soft power to suppress criticism of its tactics” (Byman and Saber
2019). Beyond the criticism of undemocratic human rights violations in this region, “neither the
United States nor other countries have shown more than token concern for China’s mass
incarceration and surveillance programs” (Byman and Saber 2019). Byman and Saber argue that
stems from a China’s economic dominance wherein other countries rely on China’s “economic
influence as well as arms sales, surveillance assistance, and limited security cooperation to gain
their support in general and for terrorism-related issues” (2019). Exports are used to strengthen
China’s own surveillance capacity, for example, “Chinese firms are working with Etiopia,
Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, and other states to help them monitor political opposition
and journalists” (Byman and Saber 2019). Venezuela, in particular, developed the “fatherland
card” database from the Chinese telecommunications company ZTE which the Chinese
government can access and use to innovate its algorithms. The United States has historically
exercised similar power especially when it comes to monitoring and eventually extraditing their
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political opposition and restricting freedom of speech of journalists such as Edward Snowden
and Julian Assange. As a member of the U.N. China has “ratified nearly all U.N conventions
related to counterterrorism” and has even “advocated for U.N. members to agree on a definition
of terrorism that can serve as the foundation of future counterterrorism work and for U.N.
counterterrorism to address the supposed root causes of terrorism such as poverty and the desire
for self determination” (Byman and Saber 2019). China playing a more active role in the shaping
of the debates and measures that make up the counterterrorism approaches that claim to reflect
liberal values demonstrates a legitimization and normalization of China’s position and influence
on the global stage.
Chapter 3 The United States of Punishment
I was immediately drawn to the political existential crises digital technologies have
forced around concepts of liberty, privacy and identity in the United States because these
supposed values are structurally limited by mechanisms of punishment and policing. The United
States has reached globally unprecedented rates of this technocratic, penal data-harvesting with
113 million people who have an immediate family member who has ever been to prison or jail
(Sawyer and Wagner 2022). Despite extraordinary uprisings and global collective action against
prisons and policing, 1 in 3 people in the US has been touched by the criminal justice system and
billions of dollars continue to be funneled into the most violent and extreme institution for
managing social problems. Policing mechanisms in this country obviously do not directly
correlate to crime rates because penal reach has extended to more people as crime rates have
constantly decreased. How does penal power expand while less people are available to convict
and imprison? This network derives from the “Broken Windows” theoretical approach of nearly
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40 decades ago which assumes community solidarity through informal social control capacities
are threatened by fear of disorderly people, or disreputable behavior. In this social framework,
major violent crimes can be prevented by positioning police as the first response to small scale
disorder or non technically lawbreaking deviance. This model promoted the expansion of the
informal social control capacities of policing as a solution to “urban decay” (Kelling and Wilson
1982). The majority of evidence reveals “misdemeanor policing,” as it is now understood, to be
criminogenic and creates the conditions where people are more likely to commit crime. Issa
Kohler-Hausmann’s piece on the increased criminalization of misdemeanor offenses in New
York City highlights the managerial, processing, and categorization mechanisms of the criminal
justice system as a part of state functions beyond managing crime. She discovers that most
misdemeanor cases move through the system over a long period of time, yet eventual get
dismissed without any conviction. She notes these interactions with the justice system as
processes of “marking, procedural hassle, and performance” which extends far beyond the
supposed goal of criminal control. She examines a crucial question: if the criminal justice system
is not labeling misdemeanor offenders as criminals, how are they categorizing or managing them
and why? She argues that a focus on imprisonment doesn’t capture the full reach of penal
institutions. Her analysis of misdemeanor policing reveals how criminal justice processes
abdicates adjudicative responsibility for a more managerial intention: procedural records keeping
for programs and officials to figure out what the type of person is in front of them and manage
“adherence” or progress over a period of time (2013).
This perspective positions punishment, prisons, and policing, as central social phenomena
“which has a set of determinants and social significance which go well beyond the technical
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requirements of crime control” (Garland 2014). Evidence of this method of social management
reveals a criminogenic mechanism; it departs from the adversarial model of comprehensive fact
based sentencing trials which funnels discretionary power to prosecutors who can unilaterally
decide whether a person is guilty, a case is worth trying, and how to leverage sentencing.
Defendants have little insight into these processes and little recourse once a sanction is delivered;
the time and cost required for self-advocacy to challenge these sanctions is transferred to
individual. Legitimized through penal legislation, the cost of criminal law administration has
been passed on onto civilians through civil assets forfeiture, victim assistance fees, parole
service fees, mandatory surcharges and more. Criminologists generally have to reckon with the
many processes of policing and punishment which are dissociated from crime but rather
functioning in the broader domain of capitalist social hierarchy and organization. Policing and
criminal institutions have the authority to attach significant identity markers to individuals
deemed criminal or deviant, yet; these societal codes have had little deterrent effect on criminal
activity in general, but rather mark, process, and categorize subjects situated in “a network of
power-knowledge by recording facts of their actions and status to be used by officials in other
areas of social life” (Kolher-Hausmann 2013). In contrast to AI implementation in China, US
innovation is less informed by the social needs of the public but by the needs of the market.
Notably law enforcement officers claim that they feel more pressure, from the top down, to use
algorithms because of the hierarchical structure of their management. Development and
innovation in the digital sector of the US is heavily driven by commercial and private actors who
can exercise unilateral discretion around algorithmic processes. I argue that digital surveillance
or data driven algorithmic technologies integrated into United States social life will reproduce
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the oppressive paradigms of racial capitalism because the main purveyors of social goods,
corporations, the state, or police, arbitrate social service versus punitive solutions to social
problems along racial, gendered and class lines. Insomuch as police are a central social apparatus
or extension of state corporate power, we can understand and diminish the most extreme impact
of algorithmic oppression through a critical lens on the mechanisms of policing. Academics have
four criticisms of predictive policing. First, copyright protections limit or eliminate transparency
and there is little to nonexistent governmental oversight or communal avenues for accountability.
Second, the obvious concerns that they rely on extensive data collection that could threaten
individual rights to privacy. The third concern deals with confirmation bias or the “garbage in
garbage out theory” in AI design, and finally, If predictive policing will target the broad range
“misdemeanors and nuisance crimes” which as we found earlier have no implication on public
safety but rather furthers a process of urban or “territorial stigmatization” (Tulumello 2021). The
scariest consequences of algorithms are already inherent to policing: penal mechanisms create a
symbiotic coding signal between the poor or disadvantaged and criminality, they can irrevocably
mark individuals yielding significant social barriers, the density of bureaucracy and
jurisprudence has made justice inaccessible or incomprehensible. Transparency is a crucial
element of restorative justice or abolitionist movements which call for communal accountability
and non-punitive approaches to punishment. Digital systems and algorithms can easily be
integrated to reinforce this communal model, however, the superstructure of capitalism gives
police and corporations unilateral discretionary power over digital transparency. As Benjamin
poignantly states, “innocence and criminality are not objective states of being that can be
detected by an algorithm but are created through interaction of institutions against the backdrop
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of a deeply racialized history” (2019). This chapter will look at specific case studies of cities in
the US to examine how digital surveillance systems are integrated into mechanisms of policing
which already strategically expose, monitor and mark oppressed people. We will consider the
political implications of this penal foundation for those who seek to develop comprehensive
methods of resistance and self-determination.

Origins of Technocratic Management Ideology
Scientific and technical approaches to social management have long been legitimized by
those in power as a process of modernization. In this process, it has often colluded with those in
power as a legitimized weapon of control or eugenics to cull the unwanted and redefine
humanity in society. The idea of policing or predicting crimes before they happen works with the
same anticipatory logics that have been crucial in earlier technocratic governance, the criminal
justice system, urban management policy more generally (Tulumello 2021). Digital surveillance
and data driven algorithms integrated into this supposed progress constructs the “digitally
recognized face” as an “entry point to everything known about the past, and geared to predict
future behavior” (Nowtny 2021). This approach to digitization draws on a short term, ahistorical
and mostly speculative theory of technology in the “smart city” as the determining factor for the
progress of civil society towards the ideals of equality and justice. Smart cities are broadly
defined as a city that functions “as a complex system of systems” wherein “a constellation of
technologies-networked sensors, ubiquitous communications, big data analytics, algorithmsenabling real-time management and control of complex urban dynamics” (Tulumello 2021).
Urban problems are tackled through data collection and analysis because of the perceived
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rationality and objectivity of these systems. The basic underlying assumption of predictive
policing is that “crime is not randomly distributed across people or places;” it rather draws on
dominant criminological theories that crime derives from “environmental conditions, situational
decision-making, chronic offenders, and social networks” (Brayne and Christin 2020). Predictive
technologies are implemented in police work with “risk based deployment” that focuses
resources on algorithmically determined hotspots and “automated data grazing to flag potential
crime series...difficult for any one person to identify (Brayne and Christin 2020). Within criminal
courts, they use risk assessment algorithms to “structure decision making” (Brayne and Christin
2020). They are applied to predict a defendant’s probability of threat to public safety or
appearance in court in the pre-trial process and utilized during proceedings for sentencing
decisions. From there, they have been implemented to predict recidivism rates and influence
parole decisions. Within the structure of prisons and jails themselves, algorithms “determine the
security classification of incarcerated individuals” (Brayne and Christin 2020). Legal rules and
procedures have extensive variability in the process of application, enrollment, and monitoring
beyond formal guidelines of conviction. Kohler-Housmann argues that they are tools “managing
marginal populations that construct the status of current and potential recipients and regulate
their sense of entitlement and their relationship to the state and labor force” (2013). To assume
that all of these mechanisms work toward conviction and punishment, mis-conceptualizes the
functional role of policing within society and how algorithms would enhance that role.

Neoliberal ideology or strategy that uses the urban environment as testing locus for
technocratic solutions to social problems is what Tulumello describes as “urban

Carpenter 54

entrepreneurialism” or “corporatization of urban services; dismantling of welfare programs; and
over-securitization of public space” (Tulumello 2021). By means of penal mechanisms, the poor
can be regulated in ways that are not just about delivering or withholding services or goods, and
this social function extends even to those not actively receiving benefits. Radical perspectives
invert this narrative with a critical lens on the symbiotic relationship between the material
conditions of punishment poverty. Departments which have implemented technology early on,
ultimately led to a notable decrease in the size of the force, increased administrative control over
the public sector, and transformations in political or civil relationships to safety. In his study,
Tulumello sets out to fill a gap in critical discourse of the “smart city” that lacks perspective on
the expansion of surveillance technology and predictive algorithms in policing by looking
specifically at the implementation of Blue CRUSH (Crime Reduction Utilizing Statistical
History), a predictive policing program developed by IBM in Memphis, Tennessee starting in
2006. Within this context the implementation of Blue CRUSH citywide “can be understood as
part of a broader trend towards algorithm-based policymaking” (Tulumello 2021). Blue CRUSH
specifically is a GIS based predictive policing program that makes “use of real-time data from
reports by police officers and intelligent CCTV with plate recognition software,” the
implementation of it in Memphis, was heralded as successful in reducing crimes in the city
nationally and worldwide (Tulumello 2021). Police and policy makers claims that the program
resulted in a “26% drop in serious property and violent crimes from 2006-2012, a 31% reduction
of serious crime and 15.4% reduction of violent crime, and that the scaling down of Blue
CRUSH in 2011 increased crime rates” (Tulumello 2021). The last claim was found to be false,
the claims of reduction were true for some crimes; however, when placed in a longer and more

Carpenter 55

national context property crimes follow national trends that have been decreasing since the mid
1990s. In conclusion, “official crime data do not offer any empirical ground to conclude Blue
CRUSH may have had any impact on crime” (Tulumello 2021). However its city-wide
expansion points to “austerity” in urban policy making that is marked by a gradual shift of public
resources from social programs in Memphis “towards circuits of accumulation” and
securitization through a slow increase in MPD funding even when the number of officers goes
down (Tulumello 2020). Given the spread of these systems in cities in the US, noted above, this
proliferation can be positioned as a feature of a larger neoliberal political project to make city
governance more affordable, privatize or commodify police, and cities “as a site of consumer
driven accumulation” (McQuade and Shah 244). The emphasis on digitized security and
consumer consumption will be the basis for how algorithms determine solutions to social
problems and public services. These changes are features of what Bennet et.al determine to be a
post 9/11 Neoliberal security state. Looking at the city of Chicago specifically, sweeping
surveillance and record keeping by authorities is not new, police infiltrated and surveilled
countless leftist organizations through the Subversive Activities Unit going back to the late
nineteenth century (Bennett 2017). After 2001 these records were digitized into the system
CLEAR (Citizen Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting) which allows police to “access
criminal and case histories, outstanding warrants, 911 calls, crime scenes, license plate data,
suspect details, police booking photographs and geographical crime data” (Bennett 2017).
Chicago’s Emergency Communications Center (CECC) was merged with the Crime Prevention
and Information Center (CPIC), reorganizing the Chicago Police departments around command
centers “made the data -driven managerialism associated with ILP possible” (Bennett 2017).
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This history gives context for the expansion of surveillance technology in Chicago and the use of
high visibility cameras known as Police Observation Devices (POD). POD or intelligence-led
policing (ILP) is policing that uses surveillance, intelligence, big data, geographic information
systems and other technologies to monitor urban areas as a method of “preempting potential risk
and minimizing future loss” (Bennett 2017). The CPD was the first force in the United States
integrate facial recognition technology into cameras with an initial installment of 30, in 2003 to
over 20,000 in 2014 (Bennett 2017). The technology has developed from capabilities such as
zoom, 360 rotation, and night vision to include gunshot detection, smaller hybrid PODs,
wireless, remote control, and facial recognition supported by the 4.5 million photos of arrested
crime suspects provided by police (Bennett 2017). Integration of institutional and private sector
surveillance cameras into this police network increased CPIC access to 25,000 cameras
throughout Chicago (Bennett 2017). Facial recognition software however is primarily used for
license plate recognition with the implementation of Red Light Cameras; whether or not this has
led to a reduction of traffic related accidents is unclear. The financial incentive is more apparent
with 500 million in city revenue resulting in tickets issued since 2007 (Bennett 2017). These all
derive from different procedural and deployment tactics known to policing: the analysis of
current crime hotspots and predictions on where crime might develop in future neighborhoods as
well as identifying people at risk using social network analysis. While a 2006 poll found that
58% of people supported Chicago’s video security network, many grassroots organizations in
Chicago like We Charge Genocide and The Chicago Alliance Against Racist and Political
Opression are agitating for change and police accountability. Issac and Lum conclude that the
disproportionate effects of this policing have detrimental repercussions for urban communities
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that are “disproportionate to the level of crime, [amounting] to discriminatory policy” (2016).
These concerns must be taken seriously to challenge and hold policing accountable. The
justification for broad surveillance is that it aids current investigations while preventing future
crimes. While there is little data to support this except in locales with high crime with visible
cameras, the presence of this technology in all neighborhoods regardless of crime rates is,
according to Bennet et al, indicative of a fanciful concept of safety around civil activity and
consumption.

Garbage In, Garbage Out
Algorithmic representation of race adds to a much larger historical image archive where
visual conceptions and representations have long been the battlegrounds of racist science,
literature, and popular culture for decades (Benjamin 2019). 2018 MIT lab report called “Gender
Shades: Intersection Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification” concluded that
out of 1,270 people facial recognition software “worked best on white males and failed most
often with the combination of female and dark-skin individuals with error rates up to 34.7%”
(2018). With the ushering in of digital systems to manage civil populations, this creates new and
interesting concerns for image making and representation. Clare Garvie’s study of the use of
facial recognition software by the New York Police Department (NYPD) reveals unique and
informal mechanisms for identifying suspects. In 2017, police were looking for a suspect of
petty larceny at a CVS in New York. The store surveillance camera caught a partial photo of the
suspects face which an officer noted looked like the actor Woody Harrelson; they then used
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google searched high resolution images of the actor rather than the actual photo of the suspect in
their face recognition algorithm to identify a match to the suspect photo. This match was sent to
investigative officers who arrested the suspect. This illuminates the problem that “there are no
rules when it comes to what images police can submit to face recognition algorithms to generate
investigative leads...these images may be low-quality surveillance camera stills, social media
photos with filters, and scanned photo album pictures'' (Garvie 2019). Facial recognition systems
are part science and part art where some photos must be edited, adjustments go further than
simple lighting adjustments for clarity, before submitting them in algorithms for a search. The
NYPD used editing techniques to replace “facial features or expressions in a probe photo with
ones that more closely resemble those in mugshots-collected from other people” (Garvie 2019).
They also remove facial expressions “such as the replacing of an open mouth with a closed
mouth” or “graphically replacing closed eyes with a set of open eyes in a probe image,”
generated from a google search for a pair of eyes” and many others (Garvie 2019). These
alterations reinforce fabricated identity points where “the original photo could represent 60
percent of a suspect’s face, and yet the algorithm could return a possible match assigned a 95%
confidence rating (Garvie 2019). Operating within punitive institutional power allows for
discretionary and informal rules for algorithms, the consequence of which have little to do with
the processes of algorithms themselves, as it would not have marked people as a suspect without
specific input, but more to do with underlying policing infrastructure. At least half a dozen police
departments across the country permit, if not encourage, “the use of face recognition searches on
forensic sketches'' (Garvie 2019). Composite sketches are inherently subjective and dependent on
a victim's memory. Garvie specifically cites a case from Washington county that Amazon web
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services used to demonstrate face recognition software capabilities to identify suspects from
sketches showing inaccurate practices are endorsed by both the private companies who provide
these systems and the police who use them. Studies done outside and within police departments
find that face recognition systems are not designed to accurately match sketches to photographs,
they often fail or worse misidentify, yet the practice persists. The only oversight standard
currently is “many law enforcement agencies, the NYPD included, state that the results of a face
recognition search are possible matches only and must not be used as positive identification” or
for “investigative leads only” (Garvie 2019). Police departments claim that face recognition is a
step not a final one in identifying a suspect yet people are being apprehended and arrested based
on possible matches found in the software. Examples include NYPD placing a suspect in a lineup
based solely on facial recognition, the results of a facial software match texted from the police
department then confirmed by the victim via text as the only confirmations leading to an arrest
etc (Garvie 2019). NYPD specifically made 2,878 arrests pursuant to face recognition searches
in the first 5.5 years of using the technology” while a detective estimates it will be used in 8,000
cases in 2018 alone (Garvie 2019). The problem lies in the fact that defense attorneys are not
disclosed on the role face recognition systems played in the arrest even though “prosecutors are
required under federal law to disclose any evidence that may exonerate the excused” (Garvie
2019). Reasonable doubt of accurate identification from facial recognition software given the
data/ police departments feeding them is extremely important while there is no independent
oversight. The low administrative bar of “investigative leads only” might be eliminated by the
FBI, who have their own face recognition system, because they believe algorithms will improve
with no consideration of the data feeding them. Without regulations on data input curbing the use
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of composite sketches, google or celebrity images, and edits of images, Garvie suggests a
“moratorium on local, state, and federal law enforcement use of face recognition” (Garvie 2019).
However, just as critical is the recognition that making algorithmic functions more accurate and
inclusive for policing, only attunes and perfects the violent processes of criminalization,
punishment, and imprisonment imposed on vulnerable or oppressed populations.
Garbage Consequences
In order to effectively resist, we must first look closely at the consequences of the
“garbage in garbage out” theory in daily life. Issac and Lum attempt to answer questions about
coded bias within predictive policing algorithms by looking at policing processes and data in
Oakland, California. The proliferation of data driven programs has raised concerns for activists
and citizens regarding transparency, privacy, bias, reasonable suspicion, and how data is used.
This unease is supported by criminological scholarship going back to the nineteenth century that
suggests “police officers-whether implicitly or explicitly- consider race and ethnicity in their
determination of which persons to detain and search and which neighborhoods to patrol” (Issac
and Lum 2016). As a result, police records are not an accurate measure of crime but rather “some
complex interaction between criminality, policing strategy, and community police relations” and
these are the processes and meaningful codes which become embedded in machine learning
(Issac and Lum 2016). They look at two algorithms specifically: that of Microsoft’s automated
chatbot and Google flu trends to demonstrate how unrepresentative data is the problem facing
algorithm usage, not the algorithms themselves. In the case of the Microsoft chatbot Tay, outside
users intentionally flooded the bot with unrepresentative data while the Google flu trends
predictive failure came from Google’s own system. In both cases the algorithmic process of
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machine learning behaved correctly but failed to meet the goals of their creation. Issac and Lum
further argue that “even the best machine learning algorithms trained on police data will
reproduce the patterns and unknown biases in police data” (Issac and Lum. 2016). Particularly
because of their assertion that this data is reflective of police activity; thus, predictive policing
“is aptly named: it is predicting future policing, not future crime...selection bias meets
confirmation bias” (Issac and Lum 2016). To support this thesis, they compare national data on
drug use, to police methods and records of arrests in Oakland. Because police databases rely on
crime and drug use that is reported and potentially criminalized, there is no local data to compare
with police data. They use the 2011 data from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health to
create a synthetic population of the residents of Oakland and estimate the number of drug users
based on the national data. Based on their empirical data and graphic representations “it is clear
that police databases and public-health derived estimates tell a dramatically different stories
about the pattern of drug use in Oakland” with police presence concentrated in low income and
non-white neighborhoods which experience “200 times more drug-related arrests” (Issac and
Lum 2016). The use of drugs in Oakland as a whole is pretty evenly distributed (Issac and Lum
2016). They then apply the predictive policing algorithm of Predpol, because it claims to be race
and gender blind by only taking in three data points: past time, place and type of crime, to
Oakland police data set to analyze the accuracy of predictive policing algorithms using police
records. They find that the algorithmic model does not have the capacity to correct biases in the
police data and can only reinforce them; the algorithm failed to flag criminally underrepresented
white and wealthy neighborhoods where drug crimes did occur. They then test whether this
creates a feedback loop wherein police deployment in crime hotspots determined by the
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algorithm reinforces bias that drug crimes are not committed outside zones where police
deployed. They find that targeted policing according to the PredPol algorithm increases “the
number of crimes observed by 20%” which feeds into the crime predictive forecast of the future
(Issac and Lum 2016). Here we see the foundations of policing as a criminalizing process; the
integration of algorithms into this mechanism creates a digital layer of criminal or deviant
labeling. Further abstracting police activity from supposed criminal activity on the ground.
Digital systems are interestingly legitimized as a way to tailor accurate police response in
communities; paradoxically this legitimization means the police are more likely to respond to
algorithmic signals of criminality (fed by their own practices) than to actual crime rates. Next,
we will examine an internal study of police and courts which focuses on police sentiments and
approaches to using these new digital systems.
Reception of Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System
This ethnographic study seeks to examine the reception of algorithms both by police
departments who have implemented them and the courts which examine them. Predictive
policing is defined above, but criminal courts also “use multiple predictive instruments, called
‘risk-assessment tools,’ to assess the risk of recidivism or failure to appear in court among
defendants'” (Brayne and Christin 2020). These researchers sought to remedy pitfalls in
scholarship on criminal justice algorithms particularly the treatment of the criminal justice
system as a monolith and failing to “analyze the contexts of reception,” assuming algorithms are
implemented uncritically (Brayne and Christin 2020). To address this they analyze two
ethnographic studies: one in a police department and the other in a criminal court. There are
three similarities between them, first all actors used big data as a predictive measure, second both
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presented algorithms as “more rational and objective than ‘gut feelings’ or discretionary
judgements,” and third they find similar strategies in resistance like “foot dragging,” ignoring the
tools in daily work” and “data obfuscation” (Brayne and Christin 2020). The biggest difference is
that judges and court officials could use the technology at their discretion while police officers
felt managerial pressure from the top down to integrate algorithms into their tasks. The study was
done at the Los Angeles Police Department between 2013 and 2015 and the criminal court
fieldwork was done in 2015 in an anonymous urban county, with a notably much smaller
population, in a southern state. They found two main predictive policing models within the
police department. Person based models gave individuals on the street a points value and a
numerical rank based on points assigned for violent criminal history, gang affiliation, probation
or police contact (Brayne and Christin 2020). The Crime Intelligence Detail then made lists of
chronic offenders with “name, date of birth, CII number (rap sheet number), driver’s license
number, physical descriptors, physical oddities (such as tattoos or scars), arrest history, CalGang
designation, parole and probation status, warrants, vehicles, recent stops, and police contacts-for
individuals with the highest number of points” (Brayne and Christin 2020). Beginning in 2012
they also implemented a “place-based predictive software program, PredPol, to identify areas
where crime was most likely to occur in the future;”police are recommended to spend at least
10% of their patrol in these hotspots (Brayne and Christin 6). This algorithm claims to be race
and gender blind by only relying on three inputs: past time, place and type of crime. Both the
criminal courts and LAPD demonstrated a fear of “function creep” wherein the data and
surveillance they use to do their jobs is then implemented on a managerial basis to surveil their
productivity or decisions. This is not far from reality because so many aspects of their job are
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measured and quantified (Brayne and Christin 2020). More interestingly, it reveals that those
with power, have the same anxieties over privacy and transparency that we do. Another fear was
that algorithms devalued experience and past knowledge in the professional sphere of officers or
prosecutors so “technocratic oversight associated with big data analytics represents a threat of
deskilling” (Brayne and Christin 2020). Officers resisted by foot dragging and visiting hotspots
at their discretion while judges did not always use the risk assessments at their disposal. Data
obfuscation was more common, for example, a series of antenna malfunctions that turned out to
be the result of officers removing them to interfere with voice recognition systems “and prevent
management from hearing what they are saying in the field” (Brayne and Christin 2020).
Criminal courts on the other hand sometimes refused to share their data with other departments
all of which contributes to more hidden discretionary power among these actors. Ultimately, like
other eras of technological transformation, police and criminal institutions are wary and reluctant
to integrate digital systems into their everyday work. This perspective is crucial because it
demonstrates clear points of conflict which can undermine the power of police, and the
oppressive capabilities of algorithms in their hands.
Conclusion
Western democracies like the United States failing to regulate surveillance capitalism
while expanding predictive policing programs have led to citizens becoming “habituated to
restrictions of liberties and increased monitoring- particularly if they are managed via
inconspicuous or convenient digital technology” (Khalil 2020). Consumers are already reliant on
data-mining platforms and the state has the technological capacity to expand surveillance
mechanisms and abuse algorithms. While surveillance is largely accepted in Chinese regions,
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there have been diverse forms of collective action and individual resistance to surveillance and
facial recognition technologies; protestors have worn masks and tried interfering with camera
feeds. These have been partially effective, but the greatest collective public power comes from
information transparency as seen in Hong Kong. Whether or not citizens in the United States will
be able to reverse the use of these surveillance systems to expose the state to public
accountability rather than commercial or social convenience is yet to be determined. With the
impending threat of mass migration due to the Climate crisis, the US will continue to expand
surveillance mechanisms in order to better manage and organize the population. However, the
Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the Black Lives Matter movement related to police killings,
which were key instances of social upheaval and crisis, increased public digital engagement and
awareness of technological tools as methods for organizing and resisting the state on a national
level. A 2013 court decision determined citizens have a right to record police and the
establishment of this right “to record interactions with authority was an absolutely vital event; for
what recourse has any average person, when confronted by overwhelming disparity of force,
other than the truth?” (Brin 2000). This was a crucial moment where the state felt the un-batting
eye of public surveillance and people were encouraged to use their phones to record instances of
state violence. Through this weaponization of personal technology against the state, people were
able to counter official state narratives and legitimizations for violence with undeniable digital
truth. While a free and equal flow of information has been a tumultuous system in Hong Kong,
with less public trust in government and rampant misinformation; I believe that even with
regulation under US capitalism, algorithmic technology will still be irrevocably oppressive. The
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best recourse for citizens is agitating for information transparency and surveillance democracy
wherein the watched can also be the watchers.
There is a gap between the intended effects of digital surveillance and the actual material
effects of predictive technology. As algorithms are continually being presented as a reliable
technocratic vehicle to usher institutions and civil society into the future, they are informed by
the strength and enduring role of discretion, power, and dominant culture which they reveal
through their impact on socio-economic paradigms. The foundation for abuse of digital
algorithms lies in the integration into capitalist hierarchy which promotes discretionary power
over its AI functions and processes. Algorithms create an existential crisis of autonomy, identity,
and privacy across all aspects of society, and it is nearly impossible to imagine curbing digital
expansion. This sort of logic is also relevant in describing the expansion of punitive power of
prisons; algorithms in this system extend carceral and detention power beyond the structure of
prisons through wearable tech and surveillance mechanisms. Nowtny states that “there will
always be situations full of ambiguity for which data extrapolated from the past is insufficient or
far too standardized to provide answers relevant to the diversity that pervades local contexts” and
as such we must value a critical eye and human wisdom or ethos to determine what could be
done differently. This societal difference, according to Benjamin, is “also an artifact of
marketing, mission statements, and willingness of designers to own up to their impact” (2019).
Through constant agitation and critical reflection, people can transform digital technologies with
an emancipatory or decarceral function. For example a converter app, called Appolition, was
created by a black trans tech developer from California to redirect people’s change from
purchases to black bail funds (2019). This is one of many possible digital solutions which
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subverts power dynamics while establishing a two-way system of surveillance that can be helped
by more technology not less.This is just the beginning of divesting from penal mechanisms
because they have been expanded and legitimized in other institutions of social management in
which digital systems play only a small part. Police are structurally positioned to deliver violence
and oppression, abolitionists who seek to replace violence with models of communal care, must
reckon with the ways in which the prison has been reborn in our schools, our workplaces, our
home, and within ourselves such that the integration of digital algorithms is shaped by the
demand and power to transform institutions.
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